Drivers and barriers to environmental engagement in the MENA region by Orrnert, Anna
   
The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons 
learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an 
introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-
based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.  
Helpdesk reports are commissioned by the UK Department for International Development and other 
Government departments, but the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of 
DFID, the UK Government, K4D or any other contributing organisation. For further information, please 
contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
Helpdesk Report  
Drivers and barriers to 




Future Seed CIC 
30 June 2020 
Question 
 What are the key drivers and barriers to environmental engagement in the MENA region?  
Focus on the following 10 countries: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs), Syria and Yemen. Focus where available on civil society 
and environmental justice movements, although their interface with other stakeholders 
(governments and institutions) may also be relevant. Examples of levels of elite or public buy-in, 
as well as how environmental issues are framed by local or regional social and religious politics, 
















1. Summary  
Environmental engagement in the MENA region is a relatively new field of research (Vincenti, 
2015). However, environmental activism has been intensifying in the region during the past few 
decades. It has been most evident in countries with semi-competitive political systems and long 
histories of collective action (for example, Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt). While environmental 
contestation has also emerged to a lesser degree in authoritarian states considered inhospitable 
to activism (e.g. the Persian Gulf), “routine forms of civic engagement have become almost 
impossible in war-torn Syria, Yemen, and Libya” (Sowers, 2017).  
This review examines the evidence from 7 MENA countries: Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Libya and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs).1 This review draws on a 
mixture of academic papers, grey literature, and media reports. Despite growing environmental 
activism in the region, scholarship on environmental politics and social networks is, with some 
exceptions (Furniss, 2016; Sowers, 2013), limited (Vincenti; 2015; Loschi, 2019; Moneer, 2019; 
Sowers, 2017). There are also gaps in the research on the attitudes that civil society 
stakeholders adopt towards renewable energy (Akemi et al., 2017); how ‘green identities’ are 
forged and motivate eco-communities towards environmental engagement (Vincenti, 2015). 
Additionally, despite a plethora of studies on the role of youth in political movements and 
collective actions in the MENA region during the Arab Spring, the role of youth in environmental 
activism is significantly under-researched (Moneer, 2019).  
Key findings from the reviewed literature:  
 There is growing interest in the role Islamic ethics might play mobilising environmental 
action, but an Islamic environmental movement has yet to emerge. 
 Country context and local dynamics very much shape the drivers and barriers of 
environmental engagement across the MENA region:  
o Egypt’s dependence on the hydrocarbon sector for government revenue and to 
fulfil its domestic energy demand shapes the attitudes towards energy and 
environmentalism amongst both the ruling elite and the wider public.   
o In Turkey, the deep levels of polarisation along Islamist-secularist lines creates 
difficulties for environmental NGOs to influence the government. The majority of 
environmental organisations are secular, but the Islamist-leaning government is 
more willing to engage with Islamist environmental non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs).  
o In Tunisia, many of the mobilisations during the 2011 revolution embraced the 
environmental agenda as a tool of resistance against the political system and 
environmental activism in Tunisia grew during the transitional phase. 
o Lebanon also suffers from stark sectarian divisions and environmentalism is seen 
as a way to transcend political divides. Environmental practice often aims to be a-
                                                   
1 Jordan was excluded from this review as a separate K4D Helpdesk query addressed Jordan’s environmental 
policies and engagement on climate change (Combaz, 2019). This review also does not include sections on 
Syria, Yemen and Iraq as there was a lack of available literature on environmental engagement in these 
countries. 
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political and is intertwined with a broader set of goals relating to the production of 
a new societal order.  
o In Morocco, where the government has invested heavily in renewable energy, 
environmental activism often involves resistance to renewable energy projects 
and relates to issues such as resource access, political power, and economic 
justice. Climate advocacy groups also work with women-led small businesses on 
implementing sustainable solutions at the grassroots level. 
o Libya, compared to other Arab League countries, scores highly on the World 
Values Survey (2011) on issues including membership rate environmental 
organisations, participation in environmental demonstrations and giving priority to 
protecting the environment over economic growth (Tausch, 2015). Nevertheless, 
civil society in general is very weak as a result of several decades of authoritarian 
rule and an-going violence.  
o In the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs), environmental issues are 
intimately related to everyday access to resources, their use and control, but 
environmental activism has been overshadowed by the Israeli Occupation.  
 Successful environmental movements in several countries have key factors in common. 
They are able to appeal to a broad social base, link well-defined and seemingly apolitical 
aims to wider social issues, secure important elite and government allies, and utilise new, 
old and social media to communicate campaigns to the wider public.  
 There is evidence that public awareness and knowledge of environmental issues in some 
countries is weak. In others, citizens are well informed about environmental issues, but 
these are a lower priority than economic and social concerns (e.g. poverty and 
unemployment).   
The dominance of fossil fuel economies in the MENA region with large Muslim majority 
populations has led to growing interest in the links between Islamic ethics and environmentalism. 
Section 2 therefore looks at evidence of Islamic environmentalism in the MENA region. Sections 
3 – 9 examine drivers and barriers to environmental engagement in the countries that are the 
focus of this rapid review.  
2. Environmentalism and Islam  
There is growing interest in the role Islamic ethics might play mobilising environmental action 
(Foltz, 2000; Wickström, 2014; Ali, 2016; Abdelzaher et al., 2019; Abdullah, 2019). In 2015, 20 
countries drafted the Islamic Declaration of Climate Change2. This included a range of 
references from Qurʾanic verses and Ahadith (sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), 
set specific targets for Muslim countries, and called for businesses in Muslim countries to divest 
from fossil fuels. The Declaration was the initiative of a coalition of civil society organisations 
working on environmental education in Muslim societies, alongside The Islamic Scientific 
Educational and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO), The Organisation of the Islamic Conference, 
and the International Islamic Fiqh Academy based in Saudi Arabia. Ali (2016: 173) notes that 
                                                   
2 See: http://www.ifees.org.uk/declaration/  
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“what was notable about the declaration was its willingness to challenge the fossil fuel economy 
of the Middle East”.  
Earlier, in 2008, 22 participants from Islamic non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academic, 
government and Muslim environmental groups from 14 countries had drawn up a ‘Seven Year 
Plan for Islamic Action on the Environment’. This was part of an initiative by the Earth-Mates 
Dialogue Centre (EMDC) and the Alliance of Religions and Conservation (ARC) to “to harness 
the teachings, values and ethical law of the Islamic faith in the service of humanity, in order to 
meet one of the most serious challenges in the contemporary world” (ARC, 2008 cited in Ali, 
2016: 173).  
Ali (2016: 175) notes that “given the vast geographic expanse of Islamic countries from Indonesia 
to Morocco, there is a wide spectrum of ideas and perspectives, and therefore, it is important to 
highlight that Muslims, like others engaged in the environmental movement, may have many 
different ideas influencing their decision to join this global effort.” Yildirim (2016) suggests that 
Islamists have a mixed track record on environmentalism. Globally, some international Islamist 
organisations have included environmental components in their platforms, and education-
oriented Muslim environmental groups have formed in a handful of western countries. But policy 
oriented environmental groups in the Muslim world are still relatively few, and an Islamic 
environmental movement has yet to emerge (Özler & Obach, 2018: 314). 
In the MENA region, and beyond, some of the world’s most prominent Islamist groups (e.g. 
Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbullah, and Hamas) make no mention at of the environment in their 
party programmes. In contrast, the governments of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and 
Egypt (with varying levels of Islamist control of the government) have, to varying degrees, 
acknowledged concerns about the environmental (Yildirim, 2016: 219): 
Iran: The Islamic Republic of Iran offers strong evidence of an applied Islamic environmental 
ethic (Foltz, 2000: 69). The revolutionary government asserted its commitment to environmental 
protection by including it in its 1979 constitution (Foltz, 2000: 69; Yildirim, 2016: 2019). In 1996, 
the Islamic environmentalism incorporated into a paper by the Department of the Environment 
(DOE) which stated that 'the religious leaders in Iran have found the principles of environmental 
conservation compatible with the general guidelines of the holy religion of Islam.’ (Yildirim, 2016: 
219). The DOE is tasked with ensuring ‘sustainable development’ in all of Iran’s provinces, 
overseeing the country’s national parks and other protected areas, articulating policy, and 
administering public education programmes. Additionally, several NGOs have emerged, 
including the Green Party of Iran, which, although not an officially registered NGO, has been very 
vocal about defending Iran’s environment (Yildirim, 2016: 219). Foltz (2000: 71) suggests that ‘In 
Iran, official as well as public attitudes toward the natural environment appear to be unique in the 
Muslim world.’ This may be due to the fact that Iran’s Islamist regime has been faced with 
significant environmental challenges throughout its term (e.g. excessive pollution, 
overpopulation, and environmental degradation). As a result, the government of Iran began an 
effort to articulate and follow an environmental policy, even when it meant revisiting some 
previous policies (e.g. their policy on birth control and population growth) (Foltz, 2000; Yildirim, 
2016).  
Several examples of the interface between environmentalism and Islam, in the countries studied 
in this review and beyond, were identified in the literature: 
5 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: In 1983, the Saudi government enlisted several Islamic scholars 
from the University of Jeddah to create an environmental policy centred on Islam. The Kingdom 
hired several non-Saudi environmental experts (e.g. Iraqi Mawil Izzi Dien and American Abd-ar 
Rah-man Llewellyn) to head the Meteorology and Environmental Protection Administration of 
Saudi Arabia, which is heavily based in Islamic environmentalism (Yildirim, 2016: 219). 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan: In 1992, the Islamist government of Pakistan established the 
‘National Conservation Strategy Unit’ within the Ministry of Environment, Local Government, and 
Rural Development. The government is heavily influenced by a variety of environmental NGOs, 
which succeeded in bringing about the Environmental Protection Act of 1997. However, many 
religious scholars there do not find the environment to be a serious concern in relation to other 
issues (Yildirim, 2016: 219). 
Republic of Turkey: Turkey’s Islamist parties have also begun to acknowledge the environment 
in recent years, although there is also evidence that environmental concern is lacking among 
most practicing Turkish Muslims (Yildirim, 2016: 219). Historically, Islamist parties in Turkey 
supported heavy industry instead of highlighting environmentalism. In 1997, Virtue Party (FP) 
called for “sustainable development” and “sustainable tourism” in their party platform, while 
Felicity Party (SP) outlines a programme “stress[ing] the importance of the natural environment” 
and calls for “sustainable development, cooperation with NGOs, and public awareness 
programs”. The Muslim democratic party (AKP), currently in government, devotes two pages to 
the environment in its platform. This explains concerns for the environment, and vows to oppose 
any development or model of production that pollutes the environment (Yildirim, 2016: 220). 
However, a number of scholars note that there is little evidence that the ruling party is guided by 
Islamic ecological sensibilities (Özler & Obach, 2018: 314; Yildirim, 2016: 220).   
Given the deep polarisation in Turkey along Islamist-secularist lines (Wickström, 2014; Yildirim, 
2016; Özler & Obach, 2018), environmentalism has been cast in stark oppositional terms. This 
makes collaboration or compromise between secular-identified environmentalists and the AKP 
government difficult (Özler & Obach, 2018: 314). Most established environmental CSOs are 
secularist, although Islamist-oriented environmental organizations have also emerged (Özler & 
Obach, 2018: 321). Nevertheless, Özler and Obach (2018: 322) argue that the potential of 
Islamist-identified groups to serve as true advocates for the environment is “still an open 
question”. Yildirim (2016) claims that “Islamist parties demonstrate virtually utter disregard of the 
environment in their discourses and actions”. In contrast, Özler and Obach (2018) suggest that 
these groups have expressed sincere commitment to environmental protection, but also tend to 
favour the developmentalist rhetoric used by AKP officials (Özler & Obach, 2018: 322; see 
section 4 on Turkey below for additional detail on developmentalist attitudes as a barrier to 
environmental engagement). There is little evidence that these groups are motivated by specific 
Islam-inspired environmental sentiments. Instead, environmental mobilisation among many 
Muslims is motivated by the same concerns that inspire others to engage with these issues (e.g. 
growing evidence of ecological crisis). Interestingly, those affiliated with these groups tended to 
be more moderate in their positions on environmental issues (Özler & Obach, 2018: 321). 
Egypt: Yildirim (2016) suggests that The Muslim Brotherhood’s short stint in power (2011-2013) 
shows that the Islamist party did not ideologically prioritise environment (Yildirim, 2016). Amongst 
the general population, however, there is some evidence of a link between observance of Islam 
and environmental attitudes and behaviours. Research by Rice (2006) examines pro-
environmental behaviours of university students and teachers in Cairo in three spheres (public, 
private and activist). Focusing on links with demographic variables, beliefs, values, and 
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religiosity, it finds associations between religious teachings and religiosity and pro-environmental 
behaviour. Rice (2006) argues that both government and NGOs promoting pro-environmental 
behaviours should focus at the grassroots level and find ways to utilise faith-based messages to 
support their efforts. Vincenti’s (2015) study on Value-Based Social Movements (VSMs) 
observes that these Egyptian environmental movements can be “profoundly inspired or indirectly 
influenced” by the religious beliefs and values of their participants. It is not clear, however, 
whether and how the eco-Islamic worldview could support sustainability-oriented social 
mobilisation (Vincenti 2015: 139). El-Bassiouny et al. (2015) studies links between corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), including environmental actions, and religiosity amongst 4 leading 
corporations in Egypt. They find that two of these (Vodafone and Mansour) prioritise 
environmental CSR initiatives (Bassiouny et al., 2015). 
The following section examines the wider evidence on drivers and barriers to environmental 
engagement in countries in countries in the MENA region: 
3. Egypt 
Background 
Although Egypt’s environmental networks have evolved during several decades of authoritarian 
rule as well as following the 2011 revolution (Sowers, 2013), CSOs remain relatively weak 
(Schäfer et al., 2018). 
Sowers (2013:10) suggests that network participants in Egypt are generally more ‘rooted’ in 
domestic institutional arrangements and interests, and that most networks are public–private 
hybrids (including a mix of state officials, environmental experts, and international consultants). 
She identifies the existence of two types of environmental networks in Egypt: 
 Managerial networks: These establish their interventions on claims to technical 
expertise and invoke the authoritative role of the state as the basis for public 
policymaking. Participants hold overlapping or rotating positions (e.g. appointed officials, 
environmental scientists, university researchers, and environmental consultants). These 
individuals are connected through the repeated experience of working together on 
various policy-specific ‘projects’ and by staffing environmental reform units and parallel 
institutions established within existing central ministries. 
 Activist networks: These draw upon different rationale and tactics than managerial 
networks. Activist campaigns address specific environmental issues (e.g. egregious 
sources of pollution, industrial siting, and other issues that impact on local communities). 
Participants often come together through a collective undertaking (e.g. a campaign to 
publicise their case, mobilize local communities, and influence decision-making). Activist 
networks frame their environmental discourses in risks to public health, livelihoods, and 
urban identities. They develop a sense of solidarity from a shared value orientation (e.g. 
commitment to human rights or labour organisation), or a shared sense of place (e.g. the 
cities of Alexandria and Damietta) (Sowers, 2013: 157). 
The scope of Egyptian environmentalism has been increasingly redefined by the prominent role 
of activist networks and popular mobilisation. Activist campaigns became more effective in 
influencing decision-makers during the late 1990s and 2000s with the rise of an independent 
media, the strategic use of existing but weak formal political institutions (such as the Majlis al-
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Sha‘b, the elected parliamentary house, and the judiciary), and the increased willingness of 
ordinary people to engage in direct action. Managerial and activist networks have typically arisen 
in different locations, in the distinctive landscapes and projects that served as catalysts for 
network creation and activity (Sowers, 2013). 
The literature identifies a number of notable Egyptian environmental campaigns, including 
Egyptians Against Coal (Zayed & Sowers, 2014: 32) and the city of Damietta’s 2012 mobilisation 
against the construction by EAgrium (a Canadian consortium) of a large fertilizer complex. 
Elmusa and Sowers (2009) called the latter “a watershed for environmental mobilisation in 
Egypt”. Additionally, the city of Alexandria also witnessed several activist campaigns revolving 
around rubbish (‘Egypt Will Not Fall to Garbage and Clean Your Country’). Although these 
campaigns were not scaled up to the national level, they exposed official neglect (Kraidy, 2016). 
Barriers to environmental engagement 
Egypt’s dependence on the hydrocarbon sector: Egypt’s hydrocarbon sector is a 
longstanding critical source of foreign currency, and a key target of foreign investment (Zayed & 
Sowers, 2014). Moreover, more than 95% of Egypt’s energy needs are met using oil and gas; 
consumption increased by 72% between 1998 and 2009, driven in part by the extensive state 
subsidy system in place (Sowers, 2014: 30). Pressured by the IMF and World Bank, the Egyptian 
government has “repeatedly” announced plans to scale back energy subsidies – but progress 
has been slow and inconsistent “out of concern that reducing energy subsidies will produce 
political unrest and adversely affect low-income groups” (Zayed & Sowers, 2014: 30).   
Large state-owned and quasi-privatised firms: Despite a relatively small number of large firms 
in Egypt, their entrenched, privileged position in Egypt’s political economy allows them to engage 
in drawn out negotiations over compliance with environmental regulations rather than facilitating 
coordination with pollution networks (Sowers, 2013: 158). 
Limited reach of environmental movements: “Small and fragmented” numbers of participants 
can curb the effectiveness of environmental movements (e.g. anti-coal) (Zayed & Sowers, 2014). 
Moreover, not all environmental issues can be addressed through efforts of activist networks 
alone. For example, conservation and habitat protection require both experts and activists to 
influence formal state policies and environmental outcomes on the ground (Sowers, 2013: 96). 
Dutiful activism: Dutiful activism is one of the three types of activism identified by Moneer 
(2019) in her study on the Egyptians against Coal movement3. This works through existing 
political and economic institutions in ways that sustain their legitimacy, but can also draw on 
existing social norms and rules to challenge unjust institutionalised practices. Although dutiful 
action represents resistance to the status quo, it also sustains the prevailing hegemonic powers 
and economic system (Moneer, 2019: 44). 
Campaigns to delegitimise Egyptian CSO activists: Since the mid-2000s Egypt has revised 
and passed new laws to increase controls over domestic NGOs, particularly those in receipt of 
foreign funding and who participate in transnational advocacy networks (TANs). (Matejova et al., 
2018). The Egyptian state has also attempted to delegitimise NGOs as foreign agents by framing 
                                                   
3 The three types of action are dutiful, disruptive and dangerous activism (Moneer, 2019: 44). 
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them as ‘traitors’, and ‘paid agents’ seeking to destabilise domestic politics (Matejova et al., 
2018). 
Forceful government responses to political protest: Egyptian governments (past and more 
recent) have often used force to dispel protesters making political demands (Yee & Rashwan, 
2019; Sowers, 2013: 154; Elmusa & Sowers, 2009: 1). Nevertheless, as Sowers (2013: 155-157) 
points out, “while repression makes headlines, these proliferating protest campaigns regularly 
win concessions from governmental authorities, even as these same authorities often employ 
force to disperse, detain, and injure those engaged in direct action.” 
Dominance of ‘brown agenda’ over ‘green agenda’: Research indicates that Egyptians are 
aware of environmental problems, yet a “brown agenda” (e.g. issues of poverty and pollution in 
cities) dominates over a “green agenda” (e.g. issues of global warming) (Alden, 2004: 181, citing 
Hopkins et al., 2001). More recent research on notable environmental campaigns in Egypt 
indicates that this may still be the case, since these environmental campaigns often frame their 
messages with reference to wider societal concerns (Elmusa & Sowers, 2009; Sowers, 2013). 
Drivers of environmental engagement 
Lessons from environmental interventions: In the literature on environmental movements, a 
number of factors were found to strengthen them:  
 Building broad coalitions: Although historical Egyptian protests involved homogenous 
groups (e.g. union members, syndicates) (Elmusa & Sowers, 2009), more recent protests 
have broadened their social base. For example, Egyptians Against Coal was a ‘loose 
coalition’ of civil society, including human rights organisations; young environmental 
activists and professionals; established conservation organisations, and members of the 
‘Tahrir networks’ (the activist alliances forged in the 2011 protests movement; 
environmental experts and the Egyptian Doctors Syndicate) (Zayed & Sowers, 2014).4 In 
some cases these have successfully crossed stratified social class and occupational 
lines (Sowers, 2013; Sowers, 2009). In Damietta, protestors included representatives of 
voluntary organisations, members of Parliament, business representatives, university 
professors, landowners and residents living nearby the petrochemical plants, members of 
unions, professional syndicates, and different political parties. (Sowers, 2013: 85; Elmusa 
& Sowers, 2009). Sowers (2013: 85) notes that “no single party, individual or interest 
group monopolised the campaign; instead, activists and concerned community residents 
formed several popular committees […] to facilitate coordination.” Notably, the Damietta 
campaign against EAgrium did not set civil society in opposition to the state (Sowers, 
2013; Elmusa & Sowers, 2009: 1). Instead, campaign messages were framed as pleas to 
President Mubarak and his family, in order to legitimise the protests and distinguish them 
from anti-regime protests (Elmusa & Sowers, 2009: 3). 
                                                   
4 The Egyptians Against Coal coalition included human rights organisations (The Land Center for Human Rights, 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights), Platform (a London-
based organisation working on the global fossil fuel industry and its ties to universities, government and big 
business); young environmental activists and professionals (from Egypt Climate Change Coalition, Dayma, 
Green Arm of Nahdat al-Mahrousa and 350.org), established conservation organisations (National Conservation 
Egypt, Hurghada Environmental Protection and Conservation Association); members of the ‘Tahrir networks’ 
(including, for example, Tammarud and the Revolutionary Socialists); environmental experts and the Egyptian 
Doctors Syndicate (Zayed & Sowers, 2014). 
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 Framing movement aims within wider societal concerns: These movements often 
adopted “limited, well-defined and seemingly apolitical aims” (e.g. combatting health 
threats posed by pollution; the subsidy of foreign investors; widespread government 
corruption, and lack of environmental enforcement) (Zayed & Sowers, 2014: 33) which 
can be linked to the broader social, economic and political context (Moneer, 2019: 46). In 
Damietta, activist networks made their demands in the name of everyday, ordinary 
people, evoking a sense of distinctive communal identity to question the role of foreign 
investors in the domestic political economy (Sowers, 2013).  
 Utilising new and old media to communicate their messages (Moneer, 2019; Sowers, 
2014; Elmusa & Sowers, 2009), through state-owned and opposition media outlets, as 
well as emerging new independent newspapers, privately owned TV stations and 
regional satellite channels (e.g. Al-Jazeera) (Elmusa & Sowers, 2009). Egyptians Against 
Coal also launched a social media campaign to organise public meetings (Zayed & 
Sowers, 2014). 
 Employing diverse protest tactics and mobilising strategies. Damietta protesters 
used coordinated statements and petitions; marches and vigils; litigation and strikes. 
Demonstrations were strategically timed to coincide with holidays (Elmusa & Sowers, 
2009: 1-3). Activists made use of an extensive infrastructure (mosques, public squares, 
workplaces, and associational offices) to engage citizens (Sowers, 2013: 86). Egyptians 
Against Coal utilised well attended public meetings against coal, technical workshops 
(closed to the wider public) and messages disseminated through traditional and social 
media (Zayed & Sowers, 2014).  
 Engaging influential allies: Egyptians Against Coal and the Damietta protests engaged 
high profile allies. In Damietta, this included local economic elites and politicians (e.g. the 
Chamber of Tourist Facilities) whose views on local development contrasted with the 
central government.  Egyptians Against Coal also found allies within the cabinet (the 
Ministry of Tourism who was concerned about the environmental impact of supporting 
coal on Red Sea resorts and macrosystems; and Dr. Laila Iskandar, who briefly held the 
post of Minister of State for Environmental Affairs from 2013 – 2014). (Zayed & Sowers, 
2014) 
Value-based Social Movements (VSMs): VSMs are “dynamic and multi-dimensional 
movements based around defensive, non-strategic social action that is normally not recognised 
as having a transformative potential” (Vincenti, 2015: 136). They can mobilise ordinary citizens to 
create and support shared ecological ideals (nurturing ‘eco-citizens’); through these individual 
and collective lived alternatives are constructed to improve communities. Examples include 
Nawaya (an Egyptian permaculture movement inspired by the revolution) and Tadamun (an 
initiative for urban solidarity). Both of these initiatives are non-political, committed to eco-ethical 
values, with a marked focus on environmental education and learning, community empowerment 
and resilience (Vincenti, 2015: 136). 
Rise of young activists: Rice (2006: 386) highlights the lack of participation of young people in 
environmental activism in Egypt despite 45% of the population being aged under 18. There is 
evidence, however, that this is changing. Moneer‘s (2019: 46) research on youth involvement in 
the Egyptians Against Coal campaign, suggests a growing environmental awareness, agency 
and willingness to take action against the fossil fuel industry and unsustainable capitalist system 
amongst young Egyptians (Moneer, 2019: 46). Similarly, Vincenti (2015) finds generational 
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identity a striking feature of VSMs; indeed, “young people constitute the bulk of the activists 
involved in sustainability-oriented actions” (Vincenti; 2015: 136). 
Environmental concern spans the class divide: Contrary to frequently expressed sentiments 
among Egyptian elites that poor and middle-class areas suffer more from pollution because the 
people living there are ignorant about the issues, research indicates that middle and lower 
classes are ‘acutely aware’ of environmental hazards and pollution. Indeed, environmental issues 
rank concerns about environment above economic worries, family problems and crime (Alden, 
2004: 181, citing Hopkins, Mehanna & el-Haggar, 2001). Nevertheless, opinions and actions 
related to the environment are constantly evolving in Egypt (Alden, 2004: 181, citing Hopkins et 
al., 2001). 
The tourism industry: Egypt promotes a ‘green economy’ approach to achieving sustainable 
development (Ramzy, 2013: 125) in five key sectors of the Egyptian economy: agriculture, 
tourism, water, energy, and waste management. Ramzy (2013) suggests that tourism is both a 
potential catalyst of change and a component of transformation and that small improvements 
toward greater sustainability can have important impacts in shifting towards more sustainable, 
cleaner and low-carbon economic growth.  Sowers (2013; 2009) observes that actors from the 
tourism industry were often important allies to notable Egyptian environmental campaigns (e.g. 
Egyptians Against Coal; the Damietta protests). 
4. Turkey 
Background 
Environmental social movements and activism in Turkey first emerged in the 1980s (Knudsen, 
2015: 306). Although Turkey ranks among the 20 biggest economies in the world following 
economic growth in recent years, rapid industrial development and expansion of infrastructure 
have contributed to significant environmental degradation. Together with opportunities for greater 
civic engagement starting in the late 1990s, this has encouraged increased environmental 
activity by CSOs. Although this has primarily been campaigns by local grassroots groups 
directed at one specific issue, more formal and broadly focused domestic environmental 
advocacy groups addressing wider national environmental policy concerns have also emerged 
(Özler & Obach, 2018: 311). Environmental NGOs range from associations, foundations, 
platforms, city councils, regional platforms, local agendas, university student clubs, citizen 
initiatives and coalitions on issues including energy, waste, mining and climate change (Yildirim 
& Ayna, 2018: 421).5 These groups vary in their focus (from wider environmental concerns to 
specific issues, like water protection) and activities (e.g. public education, research, more explicit 
political action) (Özler & Obach, 2018: 315-316). The Turkish environmental movement also has 
powerful international allies, including transnational environmental NGOs and foundations, 
                                                   
5 Yildirim and Ayna (2018: 422-426) identify a number of ‘effective’ environmental NGOs: Turkish Foundation for 
Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats (TEMA); Environment 
Foundation of Turkey (TÇV); and Turkish Society for the Protection of Nature (TTKD). Özler and Obach (2018) 
also highlight the work of TEMA as the ‘largest and most established environmental group’, in addition to the 
Water Foundation, the Buğday Ecological Life Association, TURMEPA Clean Sea Association, Yeryüzü (Earth) 
Association and the Peace with Earth Association. 
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foreign governments and the international community. Despite this, Turkey’s environmental 
movement remains limited and weak (Özler & Obach, 2019: 777).  
Barriers to environmental engagement 
Sectarian divisions: Several scholars highlight the deep partisan divides that exist in Turkey 
(Knudsen, 2015; Özler & Obach, 2018), and how polarisation along cultural, religious and political 
divides shape environmental activism (Özler & Obach, 2018: 324). Knudsen (2015) argues that 
examining identity dynamics, and the power the state holds over these, is key to understanding 
environmental politics. Despite this, the research literature on environmental protest in Turkey has 
tended to neglect identity issues (Knudsen, 2015: 321). 
Environmental advocates are commonly viewed by the ruling Islamist leaning AKP government 
as “partisans simply doing the bidding” of [secular] opposition forces” (Özler & Obach, 2018: 
317). In turn, oppositional secularist identities among some environmental advocates have been 
enforced, further exacerbating polarisation in the environmental arena. (Özler & Obach, 2018: 
317). In some instances, divisions between secular-identified environmental groups and the AKP 
government takes material form. Several environmental leaders reported that state support for 
environmental programmes or research had been cut or diverted from organisations perceived 
as critical of the government or otherwise from the “wrong side” of the cultural divide (Özler & 
Obach, 2018: 318). Özler and Obach (2018: 319) suggest that this creates a “self-reinforcing 
cycle that fosters polarization around environmental issues”. This leaves little to no room for 
collaboration or compromise between secular-identified environmentalists and the Islamist-
leaning AKP government (Özler and Obach, 2018: 313). Some environmental have stopped 
attempting to work with state officials to advance policy, focusing instead on public education and 
campaigns to promote ecologically sound personal lifestyle choices (e.g. purchasing natural 
products or riding bicycles) (Özler & Obach, 2018: 320). 
Cultural characteristics: Two particular values hinder prioritising environmental protection (Özler 
& Obach, 2019: 774):  
 Developmentalism (i.e. ‘a strong desire for domestic economic growth’): Although the 
desire for economic progress is a global phenomenon, the sentiment is particularly strong 
in Turkey, amongst government officials as well as Turkish citizens. Environmental 
protection is often perceived as in opposition to these development goals, thus 
undermining environmental appeal (Özler & Obach, 2019: 778). According to Yildirim 
(2016: 220), “the main concern for AKP is economic growth, which involves heavy 
decentralization and privatization, with the hope that environmental protection will be 
taken up by local municipalities.” In order to remain in line with IMF-sanctioned neoliberal 
policies, AKP’s environmental concerns have taken a backseat (Yildirim, 2016: 220). 
 Suspicion of foreign influence on national affairs: Occupation of Turkey serves as a 
historical foundation for cultural attributes that can weaken environmental activism. 
Turkish culture is imbued with a strong suspicion of foreign powers and their efforts to 
influence domestic affairs (Knudsen, 2015: 316). Although this has provided rhetorical 
sources for some environmental struggles6, it can also constrain environmental actions 
                                                   
6 Some contemporary environmental movements use nationalist rhetoric and symbolism (e.g. discourses about 
‘the sanctity and unity of the community, the fatherland, and the soil’) to mobilise against hostile foreign forces. 
(Knudsen, 2015: 316). 
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and cooperation.  The environmental movement is international in character and 
environmental movements around the world seek global cooperation on environmental 
issues (Knudsen, 2015: 317; Özler & Obach, 2019: 778-779). In Turkey, however, it is 
unusual for place-based environmental movements in Turkey to cooperate beyond the 
borders of Turkey as local communities are keen not to distance themselves from 
“mainstream” national identity (Knudsen, 2015: 318). Some environmental activists in 
Turkey have faced accusations concerning their identity or political stance, including 
accusations about being foreign agents or involved in separatism (Knudsen, 2015: 313; 
Özler &Obach, 2019: 786)7. The fact that much funding for environmental research and 
campaigns in Turkey comes from European-based foundations lends credibility to these 
charges (Özler & Obach, 2019: 786).  
Cultural values interacting with structural mechanisms: Attitudes of developmentalism 
interact with structural mechanisms in a self-reinforcing fashion. The prioritisation of economic 
development is reflected in the power of different parliamentary commissions and in the 
delegation of environmental responsibility within the ministries. Over the years, responsibility for 
environmental issues has been passed between different ministries. Environmental NGO 
leaders, as well as some bureaucrats within government, challenged situating environmental 
responsibility alongside urban issues, arguing that this diminishes attention to the environment. 
Activists argue that there should be one ministry with environmental protection as its sole focus 
(Özler & Obach, 2019: 782). 
Powerful economic actors: Given that threats to the environment often come in the form of 
development projects advanced by private industry, environmentalists often find themselves in 
conflict with powerful economic actors and their allies in government (Özler & Obach, 2018: 315). 
Low levels of citizen participation: Participation by Turkish citizens in environmental 
organisations is low. According to the World Values Survey, (2011, cited in Özler & Obach, 2018: 
316) just 0.8% of Turkish respondents identify as active members in environmental 
organisations, compared to the average of 3.6% in developing countries. National polling data 
suggests recognition of the severity of environmental problems, but that Turkish citizens give 
these issues relatively low priority. For example, in one university poll only 0.3% of the 
respondents identified environmental problems as the most significant issue facing Turkey, down 
from 1.1% in 2010 (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu 2010 cited in Özler & Obach, 2019: 774). Özler and 
Obach (2019: 782) find that the majority of the population places greater priority on economic 
concerns (e.g. poverty and unemployment) than on environmental degradation. Wickström 
(2014: 130) suggests that environmental protection is often considered “an elitist hobby.”  
Lack of resources: Environmental groups are often under resourced, impeding their ability 
advance a proactive environmental agenda (Özler & Obach, 2018: 316).  
                                                   
7 According to Knudsen (2015): ‘professional’ environmental organisations (such as TEMA, TuRMEPA, 
DoĞADER and Greenpeace) may seek international cooperation, but some national movements and 
organisations such as KİP, Halkevleri and to a certain extent the Brotherhood of Rivers Platform (Derelerin 
Kardeşliği Platformu, DKP), are careful to avoid overly overt cooperation with foreign organisations (Knudsen, 
2015: 318). 
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Drivers of environmental engagement 
Local, issue-based activism: Because of the sectarian divisions in Turkey, environmental 
organisations often avoid overt political action and instead engage in issue-based activism 
(Knudsen, 2015: 303). Historically, environmental mobilisation has tended to occur as grassroots 
efforts responding to specific development projects (e.g. mining, hydroelectric dams, coal plants 
and infrastructure projects), where local communities feel threatened by more powerful economic 
actors and their interests. Campaigns that focus on issues that directly affect people’s lives can 
nurture unconventional alliances (Özler & Obach, 2018: 323). In such cases environmentalists 
“intentionally avoid direct reference to the government officials whose aid is ultimately needed to 
stop a project, instead focusing on the companies invested in the development” (Özler & Obach, 
2018: 324). By focusing on threats to environment and human well-being, sensitive partisan 
divisions are avoided and allow citizens to find common ground (Özler & Obach, 2018: 324). 
Knudsen’s observations (2015: 320) support this view: “Recent developments in Terme and 
Ünye demonstrate how ‘above politics’ mobilisation is possible when protesters stick to a more 
neutral language which gives less room for ideological and identity statements with reference to 
the national identity landscape”. 
The impact of such mobilisations in Turkey is, however, not clear. Knudsen (2015: 307) suggests 
that “many hydropower projects have been cancelled or postponed after courts ruled against 




Environmental mobilisation became common in Tunisia following the 2011 uprising as activists 
were able to mobilise for the first time without facing harsh repression (Loschi, 2019). Indeed, 
many of the mobilisations in early 2011 embraced the environmental agenda as a tool of 
resistance against the political system. Environmental activism in Tunisia grew stronger during 
the transitional phase between the fall of Ben Ali in early 2011 and the second parliamentary 
elections at the end of 2014 (Loschi, 2019: 97-99)8. Many environmental protests are rooted in 
older forms of mobilisation (e.g. against industrial projects by energy corporations and the 
petrochemical industry in the oases of southern Tunisia) (Loschi, 2019: 96). 
There is a limited literature on environmental engagement in Tunisia. One notable exception is a 
Loschi’s (2019) study, which examines the environmental protests that occurred in Tunisia after 
the 2011 uprisings. This analyses factors underpinning the rise of the environmental networks 
during the transition period between 2011–2014 (further detail is provided in the sections below). 
Another paper that provides some useful insights is by Ben Fraji et al. (2019). This examines the 
                                                   
8 Loschi (2019: 100) suggests that one of the most successful Tunis-based networks that emerged was an NGO 
named SOS BIAA (‘biaa’ is Arabic for ‘environment’). She also highlights Tunisian Association for Health 
Promotion (Association Tunisienne pour la Promotion de la Santé (ATPS)). Both of these NGOs sought to act as 
watchdogs, monitoring the actions of national institutions, and trying to mobilise public opinion (Loschi, 2019: 
100). 
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case of water transfers from the Ichkeul Lake-Lagoon system, mapping out the various actors, 
their stakes, discourses and strategies, and decision-making power of these actors.  
Barriers to environmental engagement  
Ideological divisions: Political and ideological divisions still played a part in protest dynamics 
following the revolution (Loschi, 2019). Activist groups that were unable to develop new, clearly 
defined environmental identities, and who continued to rely on pre-existing structures and 
practices, were more likely to be negatively affected by ideological cleavages (Loschi, 2019: 
102). Although the new environmental networks that emerged at the time were built on strong 
personal social ties, and often included members of the old regime or institution, network 
durability depended on the formation of a new identity and agenda (Loschi, 2019: 108). 
Asymmetrical power relationships: Ben Fraj et al. (2019) suggest that asymmetrical power 
relationships influence mobilisation of various actors on the issue of water transfer from the 
Ichkeul Basin. Nevertheless, these relationships are dynamic: the discourses and the 
mobilisation of each of them can evolve, depending on the hydrological situation and according 
to the personality of the officials in charge. The substantial asymmetry of power has meant that 
environmental activists and local users of water (public or private) have been unsuccessful in 
influencing the logic and national policy of water transfer. There has been no emergence of a 
coalition opposed to the transfers (Ben Fraj et al., 2019: 25). 
Intimidation of activists: Environmental rights activists have faced repression in Tunisia, both 
during and after the Ben Ali era (McNeill & Addala, 2013; Gale et al., 2019). 
Limited public environmental consciousness: Despite the visible presence of environment in 
public spaces (e.g. many cities have a main street named “Environment Boulevard’ and 
roundabouts adorned with statues relating to environmental issues) (Gale et al., 2019)., 
environmental issues are not significantly present in the public consciousness (Akermi et al., 
2017: 134; Gale et al., 2019).  
Lack of political will: It has been suggested that Ben Ali’s eco-friendly gestures (outlined 
above) were intended to please the European Union, a major source of funding for projects to 
clean up the Mediterranean and reduce emissions and waste. Follow through was limited due to 
lack of political will of that, and subsequent, governments due, in part, to Tunisia’s heavy 
industries, which belonged to the state. As powerful revenue-producers they polluted with near-
impunity. Those same heavy industries are continuing their pollution today in their quest to 
“produce” revenue (Gale et al., 2019). 
Drivers of environmental engagement 
Loschi’s (2019) study on the environmental protests that occurred in Tunisia after the 2011 
uprisings shed some light on key factors that enabled the growth or survival of specific 
environmental networks following Tunisia’s post-2011 transition: 
History of mobilisation: In the oases of Tozeur and Gabès in southern Tunisia, local 
environmental protests build on a long history of mobilisations against industrial projects by 
energy corporations and the petrochemical industry. These historic protests focused on 
environmental impact, poor labour conditions, and the informalisation of local economies and 
draining of small farm and peasant communities (Loschi, 2019: 96). 
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Formation of broad coalitions: Network leaders were able to bring together social and political 
actors from different backgrounds and ideological orientations (Loschi, 2019: 95). 
Ability to develop new collective identities: Loschi (2019: 95) argues that creation new and 
distinctive collective identities was crucial for network sustainability. Networks with a clear identity 
and agenda were able to connect with different types of localised activism to strengthen the 
network structures. Nevertheless, pre-existing personal ties were often at the root of successful 
networks, facilitating mobilisation (Loschi, 2019: 108). Although initial network dynamics were 
based around leaders’ personal ties, this could be turned into a more institutionalised, 
associative structure and identity grounded on a formal expertise and agenda (Loschi, 2019: 
107). Networks that were able to articulate a distinct environmentalist identity were able to take 
advantage of institutional instability, whilst those that were unable to do so became vulnerable to 
political and ideological competition (Loschi, 2019: 108). 
Locally rooted activist movements: Strong local connections can be vital assets especially 
during a process of national political transition (Loschi, 2019: 105). 
New media and social media: After 2011, social mobilisation in environmental networks could 
exploit the new infrastructure provided by the new or liberalised media (Loschi, 2019: 96). 
Facebook and Youtube were also used to market the role of the network and reinforce inner 
connections with other local actors (Loschi, 2019: 101). 
Securing important allies: Environmental NGOs SOS BIAA and Association of Health 
Promotion (ATPS) monitored the actions of national institutions (on issues related to pollution 
and waste management) and mobilised public opinion. To accomplish this, they strengthened 
relations with individual scientists from private companies and reinforced the expert approach to 
insist on the technical evaluation of the dangers of uncollected rubbish, the ineffective 
management of waste transport and stocking. Support from donors and international 
organisations was also key. For example, in 2014 SOS BIAA started to gain financial support 
from international donors, such as the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation, to sponsor such 
conferences and divulgation activities gathering protesters, stakeholders and public institutions. 
(Loschi, 2019: 101). 
Collaboration between environmental activists: SOS BIAA brought together its network, 
made up of the ATPS, and individual members such as engineers, scientists, students, and the 
activists from Tunis neighbourhoods who had already mobilised over previous environmental 
issues. The movement also included, for the first time, citizens from Djerba living in Tunis who 
wished to support the strike on the island from the capital. SOS BIAA thus raised the profile of 
environmental issues in the media and highlighted the importance of collaborations among 
environmental activists (Loschi, 2019: 104).  
Avoiding explicit political affiliation: Initial success of SOS BIAA and the ATPS is attributed to 
their apparent apolitical character. Networks sought to facilitate collective environmental action 
by avoiding explicit political affiliation. This was a significant strategic choice in the immediate 
aftermath of the Tunisian revolution when ideological schisms between national political actors 
repeatedly shaped protests on multiple issues as for or against the new regime. In this case, 
technical expertise was the main source of identity for the networks. This does not imply that 
there was no mobilisation along political lines in relation to environmental issues, however, the 




Lebanon has signed more international environmental agreements than any other MENA country 
(Djoundourian, 2009: 429) and environmental activities, which have a historic precedent, are 
prominent in Lebanese society (Nagel & Staeheli, 2016: 3). Historically, Lebanese nationalist 
elites “wove themes of nature and landscape into their narratives of national origins and 
uniqueness” (Nagel & Staeheli, 2016: 8). During the 1960s, with the inflow of donor funds, a new 
kind of environmentalism emerged in Lebanon, linked to civil society rather than sectarian elites 
(Nagel & Staeheli, 2016). The environmental politics that which emerged among Lebanon’s 
impoverished, rural Shi’a communities in the 1960s focused on unequal access to natural 
resources (e.g. water, land) (Nagel & Staeheli, 2016: 10). In the 1970s, environmentalism shifted 
and began to reflect a politics of accommodation with the status quo. Many environmental 
initiatives fragmented under pressure from Lebanon’s entrenched sectarian political system or 
were absorbed by that same structure (Djoundourian, 2009: 434; Kraidy, 2016: 20). Lebanon’s 
environmentalist movement was hampered by the outbreak of civil war in 1975 (Nagel & 
Staeheli, 2016: 11).  
An upsurge of environmental activism has occurred in Lebanon since the end of the civil war in 
1989. NGOs became “standard-bearers of environmentalism’ focusing on issues such as nature 
protection and rural preservation, the promotion of hiking and camping (especially for youth), 
advocacy for publicly accessible green spaces in cities, nature and wilderness, as well as urban 
green space and the cultivated rural environment (Nagel & Staeheli, 2016). Nevertheless, 
environment, nature and green space also play a prominent role in more recent efforts to develop 
citizenship and national identity in the context of sectarian divisions (Nagel & Staeheli, 2016: 3). 
Whilst environmental NGOs often describe their work as apolitical or non-political, environmental 
discourse and practice has become intertwined with “a broader set of goals relating to the 
production of a new societal order” (Nagel & Staeheli, 2016: 11). Indeed, few NGOs are 
dedicated exclusively to the preservation of nature for its own sake. Instead, most NGOs who run 
environmental and green-space programmes are also addressing a range of other issues (e.g. 
women’s empowerment, youth empowerment, local economic development, leadership training, 
and/or democratic participation) (Nagel & Staeheli, 2016: 11-12).9 More generally, civil society in 
Lebanon’s post-civil war context is characterised by “a fragmented system of patron-client 
networks” (Nagel & Staeheli, 2016). 
Barriers to environmental engagement 
Sectarian politics: Nagel & Staeheli (2016: 2-3) observe that “the capacity for NGOs to 
transform Lebanese society through environmental activism and nature-oriented activities is 
limited both by the entanglement of NGOs in sectarian politics and the involvement of sectarian 
groups in the environmental movement.” Sectarian leaders have used environmentalism to 
forward their own agendas and goals (e.g. providing legitimacy to real estate dealings) (Nagel 
an&d Staeheli, 2016: 27). They have often effectively co-opted, fragmented and narrowed the 
                                                   
9 High profile NGOs operating in Lebanon identified by Nagel and Staeheli (2016: 13) include Friends of Nature; 
Lebanese Mountain Trial (LMT); Association for Forest Development and Conservation (AFDC) and Green Line.  
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scope of environmental activity in post-war Lebanon by exercising monopolies over 
environmental activities in their local areas. By participating in umbrella organisations (e.g. the 
Lebanese Environmental Forum (LEF)) sectarian leaders have side-lined more independent 
NGOs and diluted the demands of environmentalists relating to development. They have also 
used the LEF to channel donor funds to protected areas under their control. Nevertheless, some 
members of sectarian elite (e.g. the Jumblatt family10) are understood to more genuinely support 
environmentalism. Yet, they (and other elite families) use forest and nature reserves in their 
strongholds as a means of exercising local political control and distributing patronage (Nagel & 
Staeheli, 2016: 27).  
Environmental activism can also be impeded by NGOs’ associations with Western donors 
“whose politics implicate them in the very sectarian system they wish to undermine” (Nagel & 
Staeheli, 2016: 12).  
Elite domination of urban development: The key actors dominating urban development in 
Lebanon are sectarian political leaders and real estate developers (often one and the same). For 
example, the development of downtown Beirut by the corporation Solidere, was touted as “a 
model of ‘smart’ urban design”, but has been widely criticised by scholars, activists, and ordinary 
people for being inaccessible to the middle class and (especially) the poor (Nagel & Staeheli, 
2016: 22). 
Social class: Social class can operate as an obstacle to the formation of large, mobilised publics 
(Kraidy; 2016). For instance, in 2015 an environmental movement that became known as the 
‘You Stink’ movement emerged in response to a waste management crisis in Beirut. ‘You Stink’ 
movement’s leaders were “middle-age professionals in information technology and the arts, 
whose activities elicited a very classed discourse with an undercurrent of sectarianism” (Kraidy 
2016, 23).  
Limited reach of environmental NGOs: These often cultivate relatively small numbers of young 
people who become well versed in international norms but whose relationship with other 
Lebanese who have less exposure to international discourses seems somewhat tenuous (Nagel 
& Staeheli, 2016: 26). 
Low levels of public environmental literacy: A study by Hussein et al. (2019) examines the 
perceptions of and reactions to, climate change held by Lebanese citizens (of mixed age, gender 
and education) living in Beirut. It finds low levels of ecological literacy and intensions to reducing 
carbon lifestyle. The authors suggest that interventions to combat this should: 
 Aim to increase wider climate change knowledge and environmental culture in Lebanon; 
 Invest in research on this topic in order to highlight its value and relevance to everyday 
Lebanese life, and 
 Showcase pro-environmental cultures, people’s connection with nature; ‘green skills’; and 
increase carbon labelling of products and services to encourage consumer familiarity with 
the environmental consumption system (Hussein et al., 2019: 57) 
                                                   
10 An influential family involved in a range of political, cultural, economic and social activiites in Lebanon.  
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Drivers of environmental engagement 
Environmentalism as means for achieving unity: As noted above, environmentalism in 
Lebanon is considered important not just in and of its own but because it offers “a means by 
which Lebanon might achieve unity and overcome sectarian divisions” (Nagel & Staeheli, 2016). 
Nature and environmentalism are seen as able ‘to transform the ways that Lebanese people 
(especially youth) understand and perform societal membership and non-sectarian definitions of 
citizenship (Kraidy, 2016; Nagel & Staeheli 2016). This is because it can make possible a 
“depoliticised politics” centred on interaction, dialogue and community building (Nagel & Staeheli, 
2016: 21). Nature can also provide a ‘neutral’ physical space in which individuals can leave 
narrow affiliations behind and perform a more unified “Lebanese-ness” by partaking in camping, 
hiking, and rural-heritage activities or in activities that benefit the whole country (e.g. beach 
clean-up efforts). Nature is considered “a space in which otherwise dissociated actors learn to be 
citizens through activities and opportunities for engagement, interaction, and dialogue” (Nagel & 
Staeheli, 2016: 15).  
Critics have suggested that the depoliticised understanding of citizenship and participation 
offered by NGOs serves an instrument of neo-liberal governance and closes off more radical 
forms of dissent and protest (Nagel & Staeheli, 2016: 21). 
Ownership of key issues by activist movements: Kraidy’s (2016: 22) study of the ‘You Stink’ 
campaign identifies ‘ownership’ as ‘a hallmark’ of social movements built around a key, single 
issue, from which they expand the scope of their demands. To frame this issue in public 
discourse the movement invested into “the symbolic capital of garbage, with its tropes of 
putrefaction, odour, dirt nausea, disease, corruption” which they linked to all political elites. This 
enabled the movement to maintain focus on a political class that included all politicians (across 
all sects) and pre-empted attempts at co-optation by sectarian forces. “Ownership entails 
developing frames that include a sense of moral obligation, environmental expertise, and a deep 
involvement in assessing and pressing for solutions to problems” (Kraidy, 2016: 23). Despite the 
middle-class nature of the ‘You Stink’ movement, activists managed to overcome this “by turning 
collective revulsion at the sight and smell of garbage into political energy, by challenging and 
exposing the official discourse of power and expertise, and by exposing the Lebanese political 
system as a decapitated, rotting corpse” (Kraidy, 2016: 25). 
Social media savvy of activists: The ‘You Stink’ movement was led by “seasoned activists who 
display the usual social media savvy and artful protest tactics that echo activism in the Arab 
Uprisings” (Kraidy 2016: 19). 
Establishment of the Ministry of Environment: The Ministry of Environment was created 
immediately after the cessation of hostilities. The Ministry has been key to creating awareness 
and mobilising resources to promote environmental quality (Djoundourian, 2009: 437). 
Role of media in promoting public awareness: The media’s role has been key to raising 
public awareness about environmentalism and promoting grassroots environmental activities 
(Djoundourian, 2009). A number of newspapers (e.g. An-Nahar) provide daily coverage of local 
and regional environmental issues, whilst daily talk shows on radio and television are 




The Kingdom of Morocco has signed numerous international conventions to promote sustainable 
development, (e.g. on desertification, maritime pollution, protection of the ozone layer, and 
protection of endangered species) (Daadaoui & Saoud 2017; Tarfaoui & Zkim, 2017). In 2009, 
Morocco embarked on an ambitious 10-year Solar Plan to become a leading solar power 
producer (Rignall, 2015). Morocco has also significantly invested in wind and renewable energy 
(Daadaoui & Saoud 2017). Rignall (2015) notes that the King has “a personal interest in 
renewable energy as leveraging the country’s ‘’strategic position at the heart of an energy 
crossroads’”’ (Rignall, 2015: 544). The dynamics of environmental engagement in Morocco 
therefore differs from several of the other countries in this rapid review in that community-based 
and civil society activism is often focused on resistance to renewable energy projects. This is 
explained further below. 
Barriers to environmental engagement 
Inequality of social relations: Community resistance to renewable energy initiatives in Morocco 
relates to the social relations of renewable energy (e.g. resource access, political power, and 
economic justice) (Rignall, 2015: 541). Rignall (2015: 554) suggests that “the language of 
cleanliness and carbon emissions masks the ways in which the [solar] plant is much like a fossil 
fuel or an extractive mine in the way it occupies space and circumscribes people’s sovereignty 
over the land so as to capture the rents generated on that land”. Resistance tends to focus on 
top-down planning procedures, the uneven distribution of project benefits, and the associated 
impacts of these on traditional/ cultural ways of life. Resistance highlights questions about the 
state’s role in perpetuating unequal resource access and control also permeate these 
contestations (Rignall, 2015: 547).  
State intimidation of activists: During Morocco’s hosting of the COP summit in 2016, 
environmental activists in the country received much attention in the international press (see, for 
example, Shearlaw, 2016; Tramel, 2016). Shearlaw (2016) alludes to the various forms of state 
intimidation that environmental activists in Morocco are still exposed to, post-revolution: being 
watched by the authorities, prevented from gaining employment and exposing their families to 
harassment (Shearlaw, 2016). 
Environmental attitudes and actions: A study by Daadaoui and Saoud (2017: 4767) found a 
“huge” lack of knowledge about environmental issues amongst the student community they 
surveyed. Education and past behaviour (e.g. childhood experience) are related to ecological 
attitudes and behaviour. Conventional social norms and influencers (e.g. professors, family, 
friends, idols, Youtubers, etc.) also play a role in shaping behaviour (e.g. enabling or inhibiting 
pro-environmental behaviour), particularly for young people (Daadaoui & Saoud 2017: 4768). 
Daadaoui and Saoud (2017) also identify “locus of control” as a key issue (e.g. feeling 
responsibility but also powerlessness), but that this was also related to environmental 
knowledge. A perceived lack of institutional infrastructure and incentives were also identified as 
inhibiting the pro-environmental behaviours of their respondents. A similar study by Tarfaoui and 
Zkim (2017) on human ecological behaviour in Morocco supports these findings.  
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Drivers of environmental engagement 
Women-led small businesses: Many women-led small businesses in Morocco have been 
working with climate advocacy groups on implementing sustainable solutions at the grassroots 
level, to (1) fix the logistical obstacles caused by climate change, and (2) create more 
employment opportunities. Women are often most connected to their communities and family, 
providing unique potential to contribute to create real and lasting change (Jaffery, 2017). Their 
involvement can foster entrepreneurship and provide better employment opportunities, which 
helps improve living conditions and social status for their entire families. For example:  
 Dar Si Hmad11 (a women-led NGO) has almost solved the water fetching problem for 
many women by implementing a new initiative of ‘fog farming,’ using 600 square meters 
of special nets to harvest fresh water from fog. This has enabled women to gain back 
time that they put into economic activities (e.g. argan oil production).  
 Greenpeace is supporting several primarily women-run cooperatives in Morocco in 
adapting solar systems to replace the more costly diesel generators that suffered from 
chronic electricity shortages. These groups are now diversifying the production of argan 
oil, almond, and eggs. The NGO is also currently running solar cooking training sessions 
that showcase the potential of solar energy as an alternative to coal, wood, and butane 
gas to women in rural parts of the country (Fayad, 2017; Jaffery, 2017).  
8. Libya 
Background 
There is no substantial literature on environmental engagement in Libya. One study by Tausch 
(2015) examines how globalisation, rising ecological footprint and shrinking biocapacity shape 
public perceptions of environmental issues in the Arab countries, including Libya. Citing World 
Values Survey data, Tausch claims that in a survey of 12 members of the Arab League12, 
environmental consciousness and activism – with regards to membership rate environmental 
organisations, participation in environmental demonstrations and giving priority to protecting the 
environment over economic growth – Libya is one of the most developed (Tausch, 2015: 20). 
There is a dearth, however, of additional studies on environmental engagement in Libya which 
might back up or refute this claim, although several studies highlight the difficulties for CSOs 
more generally to operate in Libya (e.g. Sowers, 2018).  
The lack of literature on environmental engagement may be linked to the weak nature of Libyan 
civil society more broadly. This is a legacy of the many decades of Qaddafi’s dictatorship 
(Bribena, 2017; Sawani, 2012) as well as the ongoing conflict and violence that emerged in the 
wake of the 2011 revolution (Daraghani, 2019; Freedom House, 2017). 
                                                   
11 www.darsihmad.org 
12 Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Tunisia, and 
Yemen. 
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Barriers to environmental engagement 
Legacy of the Qaddafi dictatorship: CSOs were characterised by Qaddafi as “a bourgeois 
culture” and “an imitation of the West” that had no place in Libya. Several factors impeded the 
emergence of any meaningful civil society during his rule, including:  
 The restrictive legal framework for civil society associations which impeded the 
emergence of a “genuine” civil society (Bribena; 2017). Civil society was further restricted 
because foreign funding was outlawed (Bribena 2017: 9000).  Capital punishment was 
utilised against individuals who created, joined, supported or financed organisations 
prohibited by law (Bribena 2017: 8997).  
 The regime did not allow for independent organisations free from government monitoring; 
those civic organisations which were allowed to exist were pro-regime (Bribena 2017: 
8997).  
Current challenges of civic engagement: Sowers (2017) also points to the ongoing challenging 
context for CSOs operating in Libya, stating that “routine forms of civic engagement have become 
almost impossible.” Other sources point to the volatile and dangerous context that activists in Libya 
currently operate in (Daraghani, 2019; Freedom House, 2017; OHCHR, 2015). Decades of 
repressive rule and continued threat posed by militias has contributed to a high degree of self-
censorship among activists on political issues (Freedom House, 2017). 
Tribalism: Bribena (2017: 8998) suggests that the prominence of the tribe in Libyan society 
means that other forms of social identify and association are subordinate. In a study of how the 
dynamics of religion, tribalism, oil and ideology play out in post-Qaddafi Libya, Sawani (2012: 3) 
notes that successive rulers have relied on tribal alliances which consistently created tribal and 
regional sensitivities. Because tribes have not transformed into institutions that work in parallel 
with modern institutions of state, this has “contributed to diminishing the chances of building a 
strong civil society” (Sawani, 2012: 3). He argues that tribalism (both in culture and as an 
institution) will continue to influence socio-political relationships and individual and group 
identities in Libyan society as long as Libyans do not perceive the existence of alternative 
institutions and CSOs (Sawani, 2012: 3). Recently some liberal, nationalist and non-Islamic 
actors have begun to set up political parties and CSOs that reflect their views, although “these 
have yet to crystallize into any clear form with distinct features” (Sawani, 2012: 19).13  
Islamist control: Many CSOs that are emerging in major cities in Libya focus on human rights, 
women’s rights or humanitarian issues (Sawani, 2012: 20). The formation of a union of CSOs 
was announced although there are doubts to what extend these truly reflect a union since, as 
Sawani notes “Islamist forces figure decisively in the inception of these organizations [as well as 
other charitable or humanitarian organisations] as a means for taking greater control of them” 
(Sawani, 2012: 21). 
                                                   
13 The Libyan Democratic Gathering is one of the emerging political parties which Sawani (2012: 19) describes 
as “a front association for activists, politicos and human rights activists comprising organisations of civil society 
with liberal and progressive tendencies”. 
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9. Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) 
Background 
The literature on environmental engagement in the OPTs is limited. This may be because, 
despite a rich history of environmental activism in Palestine (Pratty, 2020), environmental issues 
are often overshadowed by the Israeli Occupation (McKee, 2018; Dajani, N.D.; Isaac, N.D.). As 
McKee (2018: 450) puts is, “the violence seems to be more pressing than concerns such as 
wilderness conservation or environmental justice” (McKee, 2018: 450). Nevertheless, 
environmental issues are intimately related to everyday access to resources, their use and 
control (Dajani, N.D.). Palestinian CSOs engage in environmental advocacy and activism on two 
levels: global and local (Dajani, N.D.). In recent years, environmentalism has grown more 
mainstream and NGOs and CSOs are involved in environmental initiatives related to wildlife 
conservation, stream restoration, air and water pollution and agricultural reform (McKee, 2018: 
451). 
Barriers to environmental engagement 
Limited environmental engagement by the Palestinian Authority (PA): Although the PA is 
tasked with design and implementation of effective adaptation strategies, its role and capacity 
are limited under Israeli occupation (Dajani, N.D.). This is because it has no sovereign 
jurisdiction over natural resources or large swathes of territory and lacks political will with regards 
to mitigating climate risks (Pratty, 2020). Although the PA drafted environmental policy plans in 
2016, allocating USD3.5 billion towards climate change adaptation plans over a period of 10 
years (UNEP 2016), this did not indicate where the funding would come from (Pratty, 2020).  
Challenges for the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority: The Palestinian 
Environmental Quality Authority has main responsibility for environmental administration in the 
OPTs. Challenges it faces include an unclear mandate, lack of financial and human resources 
and having to work in two geographically separate entities (the West Bank and Gaza) (UNEP 
2002: 129).   
Focus on self-determination: Under occupation, Palestinians are primarily concerned with their 
struggle for self-determination, rather than “contemplating ‘better’ or ‘more appropriate’ patterns 
of resources use when they have little or no choices to begin with” (Isaac, N.D.). 
Lack of environmental awareness: Although segments of Palestinian society have engaged in 
environmentally sounds practises (e.g. recycling) there is a general lack of environmental 
awareness in Gaza and the West Bank (Isaac, N.D.). Nevertheless, there is a “perceptible increase 
of environmental consciousness among Palestinians” and environmental education initiatives has 
been undertaken by grassroots organisations and NGOs (Isaac, N.D.). 
Challenges for cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli activists: The political situation 
creates difficulties and dangers for collaboration between Israeli and Palestinian environmental 
activists (McKee, 2018; Pratty, 2020). Environmental activists also face the challenge of trying to 
“include within a single frame issues that have more commonly been approached through separate 
‘environmental’ and ‘social justice’ frames and to reach audiences across Israeli/Palestinian 
identity lines” (McKee, 2018: 451). 
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Drivers of environmental engagement 
Civil society participation in international environmental forums: Palestinian CSOs 
participate in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s 
Conference of the Parties (COP). Given the restricted role and ability of the PA to implement 
adaptation policies, this representation of CSOs “provides a platform for awareness-raising and 
advocacy on how to tackle climate change under conditions of military occupation and resource 
exploitation” (Dajani, N.D.).  
Local engagement: Because the PA’s authority to design and implement effective adaption 
strategies is limited under occupation, CSOs have identified the need to work locally.  
Framing of environmental issues: Although it also creates challenges for environmental 
activism (outlined in the previous section), McKee (2018) argues that the complex historical and 
contemporary relationships that Israelis and Palestinians hold with land also creates flexibility on 
framing environmental campaigns (McKee, 2018). McKee (2018: 461) illustrates how trilateral 
NGO EcoPeace14 (which works across Palestinian, Israeli and Jordanian borders) employed 
flexible framing and “increasingly aimed its proposals for practical intervention not to government 
leaders, but to various segments of the three national publics.” 
Agricultural communities: Agricultural communities are the most vocal about the impacts of 
climate change, since their livelihoods have been affected by the combined forces of Israeli 
occupation and climatic shifts (Dajani, N.D.). 
The role of the media: Isaac (N.D.) suggests that “publications, media programming, regular 
columns, educational curriculums and the formation of formal institutions such as Palestinian 
Nature Protection Society may be forums for expanding awareness”.  
Private sector allies: UNEP (2002: 131) identifies the private sector as “an important ally” in 
environmental engagement in Palestine. It suggests involving private sector organisations in 
environmental policy making in Palestine, in order to work proactively on environmental 
management and facilitate the work of the Palestinian Environmental Qualitative Authority.  
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